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"Regard your good name as the richest jewels you can possibly be possessed of; for 
credit is like fire. When once you have kindled it you may easily preserve it, but if you once 
extinguish it, you will find it an arduous task to rekindle it again." 
                                                                                                                                     Socrates 
 
Since it is not at all likely that Socrates could have envisioned the state of the world 
thousands of years after he wrote this, he most certainly couldn’t have fathomed that 
his words would ring more true today than at any other time in history.  
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Identity fraud is primarily a tool used to facilitate some other criminal act. Stealing 
another person’s identity (i.e., identity theft) does not even have to enter into the 
picture. As the September 11th terrorists proved, identity theft was not necessary in the 
commission of one of the most heinous acts in history. About a month before the attack 
on the World Trade Center, Abdul Azziz Alomari and Ahmed Saleh Alghamdi, two of 
the terrorists who crashed planes into the north and south towers, used an accomplice to 
approach a secretary of a Virginia lawyer.1 The secretary was paid to complete false 
Virgina affidavits and residency certifications. The documents indicated that Alomari 
and Alghamdi lived in Virginia, when in fact they were residing in motels in the state 
of Maryland. The two men later used these false documents, which were notarized by 
the secretary, to obtain official identification papers from the state of Virginia. These 
documents allowed them to board the doomed planes.2 They did not need to steal 
another’s identity, or commit what is known as “true person fraud.” The two men 
simply used false documents to misrepresent their own. The September 11th hijackers 
made wholesale use of fictitious social security numbers, false identities and fraudulent 
identification documents in their attack on the United States.3
Identity fraud, or the use of false identities or fraudulent identification documents 
has been the subject of much discussion, debate and legislation in recent years. In the 
United States prior to September 11th attention focused primarily on financial fraud, 
and retail and consumer crime matters. It has now been substantially broadened. No 
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longer simply the tool of the con artist or organized criminal, identity fraud has the 
potential to change the world we live in forever. It is central to almost any criminal 
enterprise, including a number of cyber crimes, terrorism, drug trafficking, alien 
smuggling, and common theft. 
Identity fraud is one of the fastest growing, and insidious crime problems in the 
world today. It’s myriad forms and use in facilitating a number of crimes poses unique 
and unprecedented challenges that require not only greater planning, coordination, and 
cooperation within and among government agencies, but with those across national 
borders as well. Identity fraud is an effective crime tool employed by individuals, 
organized crime groups, and terrorists. It generally involves a person falsely 
representing him or herself as either another person or a fictitious person. It may also 
take the form of a person fraudulently representing themselves through the 
misrepresentation of crucial facts regarding their own identity.  These 
misrepresentations of same, stolen, or fictitious identities are made possible by either 
obtaining (through theft or fraud) documents and/or personal data of another 
individual, or by the production of false documents themselves. “Identity fraud” is a 
much more inclusive crime category than “identity theft,” where one uses the identity 
of another to enact a criminal offense. By taking advantage of weak or ineffective 
identification and authentication systems, criminals have victimized consumers, credit 
card companies, government agencies, businesses, and entire nations. 
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Numerous accounts link the growth in such offenses to the increased use of 
computers and the Internet. Given the accelerated pace of these crimes in recent years, 
one could easily surmise that computers have done for identity fraud what the 
microwave has done for popcorn.  Information is more freely and widely available, and 
databases containing private information exist at numerous commercial and 
government sites. In too many instances, the security of these data has been 
compromised, or the information has been stolen, or improperly used. This can result 
from criminal activities by individuals both within and outside of the agencies and 
businesses that are charged with their protection. Adding to the mix is the fact that the 
anonymity afforded by cyberspace, along with technological advances associated with 
it, have both outpaced effective regulatory and enforcement schemes, and broadened 
the scope and possibilities for crime in general. Many of these cyber crimes are 
associated with e-commerce and involve the use of false or stolen identities. A number 
of academic studies, presentations, and official reports in Australia attest to the 
importance, scope, and nature of identity fraud, and various strategies for dealing with 
it.4   
It is clear from both the U.S. and Australian experience at least, that identity 
fraud poses serious challenges and policy choices that generally center on issues of cost 
and control. While seemingly separate concerns, I will argue from a white-collar crime 
perspective, that they are inexorably intertwined and dependent upon each other. 
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Finally I will offer some overarching concepts that bear directly on prevention 
strategies and means of control currently underway here in Australia, and elsewhere. 
 
 
The Identity Fraud Problem in the U.S. and Australia: Questions of Numbers and 
Prevalence 
 
The numbers associated with identity fraud have become staggering in recent years, 
and continue to increase. The United States Secret Service, which along with other 
agencies has jurisdiction over financial crimes, reported in 1997 that of the nearly 
10,000 arrests its agents made, that 94% involved identity fraud.5 Similarly, along with 
the U.S. Postal Inspectors, they have ascertained that organized crime groups have 
made identity fraud a major part of their international operations in the commission of 
financial crimes, drug shipments, immigration violations, and violent crimes.6 The 
victimization of individuals and corporations through identity fraud has also been 
documented. For example, one recent study notes that almost all (96%) of the 
approximate $407 million in fraud losses reported by Master Card in 1997 involved 
identity theft.7  The Secret Service also reported that the losses due to identity theft in 
1997 for which arrests were made totaled almost three-quarters of a billion dollars, 
which represented twice the figure of the previous two years.8
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A study issued by the U.S General Accounting Office in March, 2002 reports 
findings regarding systematic data on identity frauds. The report notes numerous 
problems in the collection of pertinent information throughout government agencies 
and businesses. It deals with identity theft only, and with the victimization of 
consumers and e-commerce, not government entitlement programs, which are 
enormous, and cover such areas as social security, health care, and welfare. This 
narrow focus on consumer identity theft, can only lead to a vast underestimate of the 
true prevalence and cost of identity fraud. The GAO found no systematic data to test 
assumptions regarding non-reporting or whether those who made reports were actual 
victims, or “preventative” callers (those who had lost documents, or had them 
physically stolen in wallets or purses). Using anecdotal data, the GAO concluded that 
the problem seemed to be increasing in both prevalence and cost. 
More than anything stated in the report, perhaps, the GAO findings speak to the rather 
dismal state of affairs in the U.S. regarding efforts to prevent and control identity fraud. 
Coordination efforts of various agencies are not specified, nor are they likely to be 
optimal given past history. Moreover, the FBI and Secret Service have adopted the “back-
end enforcement stance” that identity fraud is not a “stand alone” crime, but rather a 
component of white-collar and financial crimes, such as bank, credit card or electronic 
device frauds or counterfeiting. As I’ll discuss in a few moments, for a number of reasons 
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a proactive and preventative is needed to deal effectively and more efficiently with the 




In August 2000, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, 
Finance and Public Administration of the Parliament of Australia published a study 
entitled, Numbers on the Run, which reviewed the findings of the Australian National 
Audit Office (ANAO) Report (No. 37 1998-99) on the Management of Tax File 
Numbers (TFN).  The ANAO study of the TFN system had found that: 3.2 million 
more TFNs than people in Australia at the last census; 185,000 potential duplicate tax 
records for individuals; 62 percent of deceased clients not recorded as such in a sample 
match; and 40 percent of deregistered companies still recorded as active.9 These 
findings, along with the estimate of almost half a billion dollars in uncollected tax 
revenue led to the Committee’s report and its overall finding that, “…what we found 
was an organization that is reactive rather than proactive; where emphasis is placed on 
strategies that return a short term financial gain rather than ensuring the long term 
integrity of the system; and where management philosophies are not well translated 
through the organization.”10 While this unflattering description undoubtedly applies in 
varying degrees to many, if not most public bureaucracies and large corporations in the 
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world today, it was indeed a call to clean up and ensure the integrity of the nation’s 
TFN system. The Parliamentary inquiry provided 26 recommendations, covering the 
areas of ATO data and systems quality, data matching, TFN registration, tax treatment 
and work rights of non-residents, identity fraud and proof of identity processes, 
extending the TFN quotation, and the implications for the Australian business number. 
Most of the recommendations relate to improving data integrity and quality, improving 
internal processes, proactive links with other agencies, additional audits, preventing 
frauds, and providing better proof of identity processes and assessing the problems of 
identity fraud. 
The committee notes that there are numerous agencies and groups that are 
investigating ways to get their arms around the problem of identity fraud, with the 
goals of providing for better data integrity and document processing in public agencies. 
These include the Office of Strategic Crime Assessments, a working group chaired by 
AUSTRAC, the Australian Registrars Conference, the Heads of Fraud Conference, and 
the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence.11
Regarding the extent of identity fraud, the ANAO report noted the ease with which 
it could be committed through obtaining false documents, and the associated problems 
for government agencies involved in the verification of PoI. It also found that identity 
fraud posed a significant and growing problem especially with the development of new 
technology related to electronic commerce. This was indicated by the estimate that 25 
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percent of frauds reported to the Australian Federal Police involved the theft of 
identity, the availability of “identity kits” to generate high quality false documents, and 
that fabricated documents for a false identity are for sale, including via the Internet.12  
They recommended that: government agencies work with industry to develop statistics 
regarding the extent and cost of identity fraud; that the ATO improve internal processes 
for both establishing identity and preventing identity fraud; that the government begin a 
formal process for assessing PoI risks and reform; and that the government develop a 
process for working with official agencies and industry to develop strategies for 
reducing and preventing identity fraud, including the possibility of a national electronic 
gateway for verifying documents.  These efforts are currently underway. It is also 
important to note that the Inquiry’s report and recommendations highlight that the 
problem of identity fraud is a “community problem.” 
 
 
Inherent Problems in Measuring Cost and Prevalence: Identity Fraud as White-
Collar Crime 
 
The government’s efforts to produce more data, cost and prevalence estimates, 
and to quantify the economic impact of identity fraud as providing “a powerful 
step toward ensuring support for reform across all levels of government, business 
 9
and the community,” is not likely to be all that “powerful” given what is already 
known about it in the U.S., Australia, and elsewhere, and what a rather substantial 
body of research has already established regarding the hidden and costly nature of 
white-collar criminality in general. 
White-collar crimes, especially financial frauds, generally remain undetected 
unless victims report them, systematic investigation leads to discovery, or 
serendipitous events lead to their recognition.  Financial crimes are enacted 
through a number of mechanisms such as identity frauds, accounting frauds, and 
insider control frauds, resulting in massive losses to both organizational and 
individual victims. There is much evidence that has already been amassed to 
establish this as fact.13 How much crime “actually exists” is determined by the 
organizational resources available to uncover, investigate, and prosecute it, and 
more generally, enforce what most experts already regard as inadequate laws 
aimed at its control. 
The irony of course is that the capacity to do this in an effective manner is itself 
determined by the political will to take fraud seriously enough to devote such 
investigative resources in the first place. If that same political will is dependent on 
“proving” through the production of numbers that enough of a problem exists, then 
the cycle of non-discovery and non-recognition remains intact. This is central to 
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understanding the cost and prevalence of white-collar crime, which is apt to be 
neither reported nor recorded in a timely or accurate manner. 
In fact, as we have witnessed over the past two decades, the most consequential 
white-collar crimes such as the savings and loan debacle and the recent corporate 
scandals in the U.S. which have affected not only national but international markets, 
are brought to public attention only after massive losses are realized, and even then, the 
actual cost, nature, and causes of fraud continue to be debated.  
These two cases also illuminate the operational definition of cost. Should the 
“cost” be calculated based upon: the specific transactions that were fraudulent?; only 
those activities that bring criminal charges?; only those criminal activities that end up 
being adjudicated?; fraud costs cited in actual convictions?; the cost of the 
bankruptcies and failures caused by fraudulent activity?; costs of investigation and 
prosecution?; investor and taxpayer losses?; or some combination of these? All of 
them represent true “costs” of fraud.  
Simply put, studies can never fully recognize the cost of fraud because of its hidden 
and unreported nature, and the inability or unwillingness of agencies and businesses to 
discover, or record it in a timely manner. Rather, they are bound to arrive at figures that 
under represent the true extent of the problem.14 Thus, any extrapolation from existing 
reported figures, or those gained through surveys will necessarily produce an 
absolutely conservative estimate of identity fraud. Moreover, given the rapidly 
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increasing number of identity fraud cases, its growth curve will need to be taken into 
account as well. These are manifest considerations for future policy, especially in 
regard to realistic resource allocations.   
Ethnographic and qualitative study of actual behaviors of official agencies regarding 
the treatment and processing of identity fraud, their potential conflicts and disparate 
interests, as well as of the attitudes and behaviors of private industry and consumers 
would provide important information for properly grounding cost estimates, as well as 
for prevention and control strategies. These factors speak to organizational capacities 
for generating the information upon which such cost and prevalence estimates are 
ultimately based.  In the case of tax system efforts to reduce identity fraud, specific 
information regarding the state of current state of IT systems, intra-agency 
coordination, available resources to accomplish required tasks, and other organizational 
and legal issues need serious evaluation. This simply cannot be accomplished in an 
effective manner without all necessary organizational elements in place, and, perhaps 
most importantly, without systems and data integrity being given equal prominence to 
other necessary functions within the ATO. This means that adequate resource 
allocation, internal planning, and coordination across the entire agency -- not just the 
offices involved with data integrity-- need to be prioritized. Having internal data that 
are valid, reliable, protected, and integrated is a cornerstone of any healthy 
organization, especially one as vulnerable to both non-compliance and political attack 
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as a nation’s tax system. Unfortunately, the world’s governments have a long journey 
ahead in this regard.  
In the U.S., for example, even the most rudimentary steps to protect identity 
information are seriously lacking. In August, 2002, an audit of the Internal Revenue 
Service reported that it was unable to account for an unknown number of 6,600 
computers lent to volunteers who assist low income, disabled, non-English-speaking 
and older citizens with their tax returns.15 An audit of other IRS programs found that 
2,300 computers were missing. The computers contained private taxpayer data that 
constitute a prime source for identity thieves. The audit followed previous reports that 
the U.S. Customs Service lost track of 2,000 computers and that the Justice Department 
could not find 400 of their machines. One U.S. Senator commented that this “latest 
disclosure cries out for a ‘government-wide effort’ to prevent computers from being lost 
or stolen.” He further laments, “I’m worried that just as dryers have a knack for making 
socks disappear, the federal government has discovered a core competency of losing 
computers.”16 In response to the audit results, an IRS official noted that its management 
“recognized that inadequate internal controls and accountability over computers were 
areas that needed dramatic improvement.”17 The obvious question that arises is how 
many other “dramatic improvements” need to be accomplished given the complexities 





 Trying to deal with identity fraud through criminalization alone, cannot serve as an 
effective means of control. The agencies that might best foster this do not involve law 
enforcement, but the documentation and authentication of identity itself. 
Professor Gary Marx, one of the world’s leading authorities on surveillance, 
technology and social control mechanisms, points out that in complex settings in 
democratic societies, “relying primarily on technology to control human behavior has 
clear social and ethical limitations.”18 Simply put, regardless of how ideal a technical 
control system may appear in the abstract, it is inevitably subject to the harsh realities 
of implementation and actual practice. “The perfect technical solution is akin to the 
donkey incessantly chasing a carrot suspended before it.”19 Larger systemic contexts, 
consequences and alternatives may be ignored. As Marx notes, “The complexity, and 
fluidity of human situations makes this a rich area for the study of trade-offs, irony and 
paradox. There are some parallels to iatrogenetic medical practices in which one 
problem is cured, but at the cost of creating another. Technical efforts to insure 
conformity may be hindered by conflicting goals, unintended consequences, 
displacement, lessened equity, complacency, neutralization, invalidity, escalation, 
system overload, a negative image of personal dignity and the danger of the means 
determining, or becoming the ends.”20 All of these concerns need to be fully examined 
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before implementing technological “solutions.” Moreover, the lack of privacy concerns 
and awareness in various sectors of society as well as the careless use of personal 
information provide structural gaps in the social control of personal identity that 
criminals continue to exploit. As seen by the example of missing computers, the 
government may itself inadvertently contribute to the escalation of the same fraud that 
it wishes to suppress. 
Aside from the technological aspects of control, which can be compromised in any 
number of ways by competing technology and various other neutralization 
mechanisms, the human context of control also remains particularly vulnerable. This 
can be easily overlooked, as it exists in the long shadow of expensive and sophisticated 
technology and complex operational systems. Consider the following, which 
underscores the point that state-of-the-art control systems can be completely 
undermined through simple human interactions: “…a thief who could not break a 
manufacturer’s sophisticated encryption code, never-the-less managed to embezzle 
millions of dollars through generating fake invoices. He did this by having an affair 
with the individual who had the encryption codes.”21
 
The National ID Debate 
 
 
It is of paramount importance that officials recognize that security and privacy 
issues associated with large government databases present major problems. As a result 
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of the September 11th attacks, legislation was introduced before the United States 
Congress to initiate a standardized identification system that would link existing 
information in state motor vehicle databases to “create a standardized driver's license 
equipped with technology capable of uniquely identifying the cardholder.”22 The 
promoters of the bill claimed that their goal was not to create a national ID, but simply 
to stop identity fraud and terrorism through the use of phony drivers licenses. The 
proposal, which was supported by the American Association of Motor Vehicle 
Administrators, would have allowed states to “share demographic and driving record 
information in real time, and would mandate the use of security features such as 
holograms, fingerprints or other biometric identifiers on all state-issued ID cards.”23
In response to this proposed legislation, an April 2002 report from the National 
Academies of Science argued against a national ID card due to concerns over privacy 
and security of personal data collected by official agencies. The study was endorsed by 
the National Research Council’s Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, 
which is comprised of a number of private sector and academic institutions including 
Microsoft, AT&T, MIT and Stanford, among many others. It warned that current 
efforts to establish a national identification system could produce more harm than 
good, unless policymakers first paid serious attention to a vast array of privacy, 
security, and logistical matters.24 It also noted that the “costs of abandoning, correcting 
or redesigning a system after broad deployment might well be extremely high."25
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The study concluded that, "Given the wide range of technological and logistical 
challenges, the likely direct and indirect costs, the serious potential for infringing on 
the rights and freedoms of ordinary citizens, and the gravity of the policy issues raised, 
any proposed nationwide identity system requires strict scrutiny and significant 
deliberation well in advance of design and deployment."26 Besides the conservative 
cost estimate of $100 million to make changes to the country’s 200 million existing 
drivers’ licenses, the report also warned of “function creep” or future uses of a national 
ID in ways not originally intended. This phenomenon is well illustrated by the current 
use of Social Security numbers, which were created solely for administering Social 
Security benefits, but are now used as the major national identifier. Moreover, securing 
against the misuse of information becomes more difficult as the system of users 
expands beyond original boundaries, and the system itself becomes a larger and more 
attractive target for malicious hackers. 
The ATO is no different from many other tax systems in its vulnerability to constant 
criticism no matter what it attempts to accomplish in areas such as compliance, audit or 
collections. Having issues discussed openly, especially involving the use of personal 
information, serves an important educative and disclosure function that can mitigate 
much misunderstanding. For example, if tax officers do their job effectively, they may 
be seen as overbearing and unfair.27 If they are not enforcing rules, they may be viewed 
as incompetent in the collection of taxes. Fostering mechanisms to promote voluntary 
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compliance is an important goal, and that can be better accomplished through public 
education as to the importance of the protection of identity information, and what the 
ATO is doing to help in this regard.   
 
 
Self-Monitoring and Surveillance 
 
  Just as important as ensuring the accuracy and security of data and systems, is 
evaluation on an ongoing basis. Identity fraud has many forms, and can affect 
operational systems and commerce in myriad ways. One mechanism that can be 
employed to monitor system integrity involves the use of government agents posing as 
persons trying to compromise it using known techniques.28 In discussing ideas 
regarding the detection of “dirty data,” for example, some researchers have pointed to 
the use of deceptive techniques to allow access to information that would not otherwise 
be available or known to others.  Officials using deceptive techniques on their own 
agencies, should raise no major ethical concerns. It also allows for constant system 
monitoring, and the identification of weak spots in need of immediate improvement. It 
involves proactive enforcement and regulation of identity fraud rather than simply 
reacting to system weaknesses on a case-by-case basis after the fact. Such monitoring 
could take the form of sophisticated and controlled field experiments that would 
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provide substantial systematic data regarding organizational weaknesses upon which 
necessary organizational changes could be based. These system vulnerabilities are, 
after all, the crux of the identity fraud problem. This approach also entails working 
forward towards increased system integrity at both the human and technological levels, 
versus simply working backwards from actual reported crimes as “trace elements” 
which lead to the discovery of identity frauds and how they took place. Moreover, there 
is variability in the visibility of these trace elements that make them less than ideal for 
plugging gaps in the system. For example, Marx notes, “Trace elements involving 
victims are likely to become publicly known to the extent that (a) the gap between 
victimization and its discovery is short, (b) the victim is personally identifiable, (c) the 
victim is aware of the victimization, and (d) does not fear retaliation for telling others 
about it. There is a parallel here to the ease of discovering victim as against victimless 
crimes. The former are much more likely to be known about.”29
 
Conclusion 
Much remains to be done both within ATO as well as other public agencies, the 
private sector, and the general population in terms of awareness and education 
regarding issues of identity fraud. Before various technologies are introduced, an 
inventory of existing organizational capacities to employ them effectively, necessary 
intra- and inter-agency agreements, private sector regulation of the use of personal 
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data, consumer awareness and education, and an airing of the ethical and moral issues 
associated with third party uses of personal data need to be accomplished if efforts to 
reduce identity fraud are to be successful. The difficulty with quick fixes, or silver 
bullets when it comes to complex social problems is that they never deliver the results 
promised, and often create new problems. Understanding how and why the social 
system itself encourages identity fraud, and making persons aware of the need to 
protect their personal information are important factors in reducing its frequency. 
 
Organizational capacity issues loom large in effectively dealing with identity fraud 
within public bureaucracies such as tax and criminal justice.30 Their external 
environments must also be taken into account insofar as they affect organizational 
workloads. These capacity issues must be taken into account when government policies 
are developed regarding enforcement and compliance responses. A primary reliance on 
enforcement strategies inevitably results in system overload and the inability to respond 
effectively. This is akin to a sprinkler system shutting off when the fire gets hottest. 
Identity frauds in the U.S are growing by leaps and bounds, and now include an 
increasing number of “inside jobs” which involve the theft of identity of family 
members.31 The retiring commissioner of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Charles 
Rossotti, recently highlighted the stunning lack of capacity to deal with cheating due to 
increasingly sophisticated schemes. He noted the “huge gap” between those cheating 
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the system in numerous ways and the agency’s “capacity to require them to comply.”32 
“The IRS is simply outnumbered when it comes to dealing with the compliance 
risks.”33 He pointed to the fact that the IRS would need to hire almost 35,000 workers 
just to keep pace with increasing demands by the year 2010, and claimed, “If these 
problems and conditions are left un-addressed, we could face an enormous crisis in 
confidence in the tax system.”34 This not only points to an important irony of current 
control efforts (i.e., the potential escalation of non-compliance and de-legitimization of 
the system itself), but underscores the simple truth that the ability of any system to 
undertake new initiatives in an effective way, depends on its baseline capacity to deal 
with current issues. That baseline capacity does not currently exist in the largest 
voluntary tax system in the world. 
Technology alone, no matter how politically expedient, cannot provide an effective 
solution. In a list of what he terms “techno-fallacies” Marx illustrates the uncritical use 
of technology to provide control and order through surveillance in modern society. A 
sampling of those most related to identity fraud include: The fallacy of perfect 
containment or non-escalation (or the Frankenstein fallacy that technology will always 
remain the solution rather than become the problem); the fallacy of permanent victory; 
the fallacy of the 100% fail-safe system; the fallacy of assuming that personal 
information on customers, clients and cases in the possession of a company is just 
another kind of property to be bought and sold the same as office furniture or raw 
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materials; and the more general fallacy of re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic 
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